US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0071/00719.txt

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$Unique_ID{USH00719}
$Pretitle{74}
$Title{On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor
Chapter XIII  Training for Battle Efficiency and Fleet Problem}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Richardson, Adm. James O.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{fleet
training
war
aircraft
problem
task
exercises
operations
carrier
tactical}
$Volume{}
$Date{1973}
$Log{Aircraft Carrier*0071901.scf
}
Book:        On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor
Author:      Richardson, Adm. James O.
Affiliation: USN
Date:        1973

Chapter XIII  Training for Battle Efficiency and Fleet Problem

     The Navy had for many years softly said that its operational training was
"for battle efficiency," instead of using the broader and, to the American
people, more alarming term of "training for war."

     The unprovoked Japanese attack on China in 1937 and the unwarranted
German attack on Poland in 1939 tended to draw back the veil for the
individual seagoing officer of the Line of the Navy, as far as the immediate
essential purpose of our training was concerned, but many seemed reluctant to
face the issue squarely.

Conditions Governing Training

     For, in our training during the long period between World War I and 1939,
the safety of the individual and the conservation of the property and funds of
the Government had been the two overriding considerations in our operational
training, all but blotting out all other considerations.

     To illustrate the earlier point, the first tactical exercises held after
I be came CINCUS contained this safety rule:

     Weather conditions and weather forecasts will be given careful attention
and flights will be cancelled or discontinued promptly upon the approach of
unfavorable flying weather.

     In this same exercise, to save fuel oil money and wear and tear on
machinery, cruisers and destroyers were limited to speeds of 24 knots,
battleships and submarines to 15 knots.

     Tactical exercises were planned carefully and well in advance.  They were
designed so that they could be conducted in a money-saving manner. High-speed
steaming was tabu, and the necessity for large-scale negative air searches was
avoided in setting up the exercises.  It was an accepted fact of life that our
tactical and battle efficiency progress should be conditioned by the necessary
for strict financial economy, but the Navy still sought to obtain steady
progress.

     The money restrictions for fuel oil, gasoline, and ammunition
expenditures stemmed from the annual appropriation bills, where the Bureau of
the Budget or Congress always set the levels markedly below those desired by
the high command of the Navy.

     During 1940, increased but far from unlimited fuel oil and gasoline funds
were made available to the Fleet.  This made it practicable to lengthen, or to
make more frequent the periods devoted to tactical exercises or to steaming at
higher speeds.  I chose to increase the number of tactical periods.  As one of
my subordinates reported:

     The results achieved from the increased periods of tactical exercises
were gratifying but restrictions as to use of fuel at times necessitated lower
speeds than would otherwise have been used.

     The progressive minor tactical exercises, culminating in the Fleet
Problems were of the greatest benefit in the training of officers.

     As we got nearer to war, more realistic training was a must.  While not
prepared to accept the adage "one should not hope to achieve in war, something
which one has not learned in peace," it did seem to me that this adage would
govern during the early days of any war operations.

     Moving the officer corps toward more realistic training was difficult but
necessary.  It was difficult because too many officers had observed or felt
the sad consequences to the violators of the ever-present "play it safe"
considerations during the previous twenty years.

     My efforts to get our tactical and gunnery training on a more realistic
basis bore some excellent fruit.  Bill Halsey stated the problem re aircraft
and gunnery training succinctly:


It is hardly necessary to state that the fundamental objectives of aircraft
gunnery training will be the highest possible state of readiness for war of
each aircraft squadron.  It must be realized that, in the early stages of war,
the success of our air operations will depend upon the battle efficiency of
the squadrons now organized.  New or better airplanes and additional pilots
may not be available immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities.  The
gunnery proficiency of an aircraft squadron will be measured in terms of its
performance in combat rather than in terms of scores and merits.  Any emphasis
on gunnery competition between squadrons must now be shifted to emphasis on
probable actual competition with an enemy who will have the advantage of
recent extensive experience and training under fire.


     I do not intend to relate the details of the tactical training in the
Fleet during 1939-1940.  But, I believe some mention of the particular
training operations upon which the Fleet concentrated its energies, as well as
my mention earlier of the limitations under which the training was carried
out, will be of interest to those officers who have entered the Navy since
World War II started.

     The basic pattern of training of the Fleet in the pre-World War II period
has been set forth in Chapter Four.  I did not alter this pattern.  I did seek
to intensify the effort within the pattern and to conduct operations in a
manner far more nearly approaching those which were bound to exist in war.

     As the appropriated funds for the Navy increased, I recommended, and it
was practicable for the Department to make available, more target practice
ammunition, so that the guns and gun crews could be tested under conditions
approaching those in battle.

     As reports came in from our observers in the European Theater, it was
possible to work up experimental practices based on their observations. Some
of the earliest of these were antiaircraft firing by condition watches rather
than General Quarters crews, and firings at night against star shell and
searchlight illumination.

     In addition to the experimental exercises, many of the standard gunnery
practices fired during the calendar year 1940 were modified so as to include
advances toward realistic battle conditions.  For years, the Navy had
introduced casualties into gunnery practices, but, in general, these were
casualties which could be corrected in seconds, if the designated procedures
were carried through.  In 1940, practices were actually fired after casualties
had been imposed for the duration of the practice, such as:

(a) the hydraulic systems for the guns shut off

(b) non-automatic operation of breech mechanism

(c) hand ejection of empty cartridges

(d) local control in train and manual control in elevation.

     The scoring system for the gunnery practices was changed by the Chief of
Naval Operations to give an extra bonus for hits on the first salvo, which was
helpful in accentuating this important part of our gunnery.

     The problem of training a fleet, in any age and in any navy, is a complex
one.  To give some idea of the training in the year 1940, I list the purposes
of a series of exercises the Fleet as a whole carried out during one five-day
period of one month in that year.

     To train surface-ship personnel in detecting and recognizing submarines
and aircraft

     To test visual means of transmitting warning of approach of hostile
aircraft

     To coordinate operations of submarines and patrol planes in both day and
night search and attack

     To coordinate attacks of carrier air groups To test measures for
repelling coordinated air attacks

     To familiarize lookouts, fire control, and ship control parties of all
types of ships with the rudiments of night attack and defense

     To exercise in night search and in repelling night destroyer attack To
develop and test coordinated mine-laying with fast mine layers and patrol
planes

     To exercise in minelaying and minesweeping ahead of a disposition To
examine effectiveness of darkening ships and aircraft

     It also should be stated that the increasing number and variety of
training exercises, and the complexity thereof, which the 1939-1940 tactical
developments entailed, too often resulted in inadequate time for study of
results, and their proper evaluation.  This lack of thorough analysis, coupled
with the strict application of peacetime safety rules, always contained the
real hazard of sometimes arriving at erroneous conclusions.

     During 1940, emphasis was given to the following in the tactical training
of the Fleet.

(A) Training by task force, task group, or task unit

(B) Training for night action

(C) Defense of fleet against attack by aircraft

(D) Air operations

     I will discuss each of these very briefly.

(A) Training by Task Force, Task Group, or Task Unit

     One of the things, which I look back upon with particular pride, is the
accentuation which was given during 1940 to task force training.  The task
force concept - a temporary grouping of units of various types under one
commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out specific operations or
missions - had existed in our Navy for a good many years.  The question, as to
whether the Fleet should be organized on a task force or type basis, had been
discussed for years and resolved with what I believe was the correct decision;
i.e., to organize it on both the task force and type basis.

     Although force commanders were, as a general rule, senior to type
commanders, the organization on the type basis exercised the predominant
influence, because the type commanders largely controlled the money spent by
individual ships.

     By and large, throughout the 1930's, the Fleet's normal operations were
carried out by types of ships or aircraft.  Commander Patrol Wings trained the
patrol aircraft, Commander Destroyers trained the destroyers, Commander
Minecraft trained the minecraft, while other type commanders trained aircraft
carriers and their embarked aircraft, battleships, heavy cruisers, light
cruisers, and submarines.

     The regular semi-quarterly tactical periods were devoted to type
exercises under the type commanders, and to task force exercises employing two
or more types under a designed task force commander.

     In 1940, the need was very great for inter-type training to give
subordinate Flag Officers in the Fleet operational functions and
responsibilities fully comparable to the probable operations of war.  This
requirement, coupled with the further need to train the units of ships and
aircraft for carrying out specific parts of the War Plans, led to the
establishment in June 1940 of numbered task forces, the very early forerunners
of the actual task forces and task fleets of World War II.

     My staff then sought to so design the tactical exercises that these
numbered task force organizations would operate together again and again, so
as to gain experience and training in the tasks they would be called upon to
carry out in war.  I have been told that this accentuated task force training
which was continued by my successor, paid off large dividends during World War
II.

     Numerical designations of components of task organizations also were
initiated by CINCUS in early June 1940.  These numerical designations were a
great step forward over the previous system of using the name and number of
the predominating units of normal fleet organization, such as Patrol Wing Two,
Destroyer Squadron Ten, or Submarine Division Nine.  They simplified the
command organization and indicated on their face the chain of command.  They
made easier the drafting of communications plans for the task force
organization, and made quite self-evident to which subdivision each of the
type units therein was assigned, thus making communications much more
flexible.

     These numerical designations were used throughout World War II.  The
famous task fleets, task forces, task groups and task units became well known
by their numbers throughout the military services, as well as to many others
who maintained a close interest in the war.  In 1940-1941, their simplicity
contributed markedly in facilitating the inter-type training in the Fleet.
Such training became highly popular in the Fleet, and was pushed cheerfully by
the appropriate subordinate commanders.

(B) Training for Night Action

     One of the weaknesses of our Fleet in 1940 was in the field of night
action by ships larger than destroyers.  In the era before radar, close-in
night action brought great risk of collision, loss of life, and expensive ship
repairs.

     If collisions occurred, it was believed that the repercussions from the
Navy Department and the public would be sure, swift, and severe. Consequently,
training in this important field of major combatant ship action was approached
gingerly and on a step by step basis.

     The Second Phase of Fleet Problem XXI had culminated in a confused night
battle between the two fleets, with some near collisions, undesired
illuminations, and missed gunnery and torpedo opportunities.  This battle led
to a strong awareness in the Fleet that improvement in night-fighting
capabilities was necessary, but the desire to take immediate radical training
action was tempered by an appreciation of the fact that radar was "just around
the corner."  Many thought that the Fleet would have radar before the Fleet
would have to fight at night.

     However, as soon as the Fleet commenced its new training year, training
in existing night exercises, and additionally experimental testing of new
night exercises were held.

     By late fall of 1940, although radars in the Fleet were very few and far
between, steady training had rendered it possible to hold simple night actions
between major combatant types, with a reasonable approach to reality.  A new
set of Fleet Training Exercises was issued on October 26, 1940.  These carried
forward the former night-training exercises for light combatant ships and
added several new night-attack exercises for heavy combatant ships.  Tactical
Bulletins covering cooperation of light forces in night attacks were issued
and these doctrines were "used with success."

     We did not go far, but at least we started.

(C) Defense of Fleet Against Attack by Aircraft

     In 1940, the Navy was as concerned over defense of the Fleet against
attacks by enemy aircraft bombing, as the United States today (1958) is
concerned over attacks by intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads.

     In 1940, the very vocal believers in the strategic use of air power
stated that the only method of dealing with enemy aircraft was to destroy the
means of their production or mobility.  It was quite obvious that even if this
were true, the military air forces of the United States were not in sufficient
strength, or so positioned, as to accomplish this at the start of any war in
the near future.

     The next method most talked about was to destroy the enemy carriers or
air bases from which enemy planes might attack our Fleet.  It was obvious that
this also was not a possibility at the start of any war in the near future.

     The two remaining, and largely "unballyhooed," methods were defense by
the aircraft the Fleet carried with it and, when this method was less than 100
percent effective, close-in defense by the antiaircraft-gun action of the
ships themselves.

     There was common agreement by all, however, that major improvement in
defense against aircraft bombing attacks was essential if the Fleet was to be
able to maintain its command of the seas.

     A study of the results of antiaircraft firings by the ships of the Fleet,
from July 1, 1938 to June 30, 1940, gave little cause for cheer or hope for
solution in this area.  This study showed that in 307 firing runs by 1.1", 3",
and 5" antiaircraft guns against high-altitude, horizontal-bombing drone
aircraft, dive-bombing drone aircraft, and low-altitude, horizontal bombing
drone aircraft, only 5% of the drone target aircraft had been hit seriously
enough to stop the bombing attack and only 17% hit at all.

     Increased numbers of guns on the ships of the Fleet, and putting
increased skill into using them would undoubtedly improve results, but it did
not appear this action would provide the protection sought.

     As early as February 1940, after the conclusion of the minor Joint
Army-Navy Exercise of January 1940, the problem of defense of a group, a
force, or a fleet against air attack was put in proper perspective by
Commander Carrier Division One (Rear Admiral W. F. Halsey, USN).  He reported:

     A Fleet can be afforded a higher degree of protection from air bombing
attack by properly coordinated aerial pickets and combat patrol.

     As I read the history of our Fleet in the Pacific during World War II, it
seems to me that the early acceptance of this principle by the officers of the
Fleet was one of the basic steps taken toward its future success in
maintaining itself at sea and thus controlling the waters and islands of the
Pacific.

     The question of where the balance lay, between the antiaircraft defense
within the ships themselves and the antiaircraft defense provided by our own
aircraft on carriers or at bases, was a hotly debated matter. The proper
balance between fighters, scout observation aircraft, scout bombers, torpedo
bombers, bombers, and patrol planes which could be accommodated within Fleet
resources, was subject to strong, special pleading by each particular interest
represented.  It seems to me that the balance, as determined in the final
analysis by Naval Operations, and which increased fighter aircraft strength,
was an excellent one.

     Antiaircraft-gun firings by ships of the Fleet were increased during 1940
by leaps and bounds, but had to be strictly controlled due to the great danger
to the plane towing the target or to the plane controlling a drone target.  It
was not until late January 1941 that enough antiaircraft firing under
controlled surprise conditions had developed adequate skill and safety rules
to permit me to issue the following letter representing a further step forward
in preparing the Fleet against a more realistic surprise aircraft attack:

From:  Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
To:  All Type Commanders
Subj:  Radio Controlled target airplanes, firing on

     1. In order that the problems of establishing effective antiaircraft fire
under conditions of surprise attack may be examined in connection with actual
firing, it is desired that the Type Commanders addressed formulate and
schedule for their respective Types, a practice conforming to the following
general requirements.

     (a) That the firing ship have advance notice of the time of the attack
only to the extent that the attack may occur at any time within a stated two
hour period.

     (b) That the attack may be made from any direction, and that it be made
insofar as practicable and safe, in such manner as to seek the advantages that
would be sought by hostile attacking aircraft.

     2. Steps shall be taken to prevent knowledge of these firings from
becoming available to unauthorized persons.  In this connection attention is
invited to U.S. Fleet Letter 31-40 Revised.

     J. O. Richardson
     George C. Myer
     Flag Secretary

     By the standards of 1939, this directive indicated the Fleet had made
great progress in a little more than a year.  However, was sure that much more
progress would be needed to be made under the actual attacks of the enemy.

(D) Air Operations

     During 1940, the following principles were evolved and recommended to
higher authority in the field of aircraft operations:

     Flight and maintenance crews should be separate.

     Ground officers should be attached to squadrons for administrative
duties.

     Duplicate plane crews are a necessary.

     These three principles stood the test of war.  Dive-bombing practices on
the mobile target ship, the USS Utah, had been held for several years,
generally under quite favorable conditions of wind.  But in 1940, the Utah
(AG-16) was dive-bombed downwind, crosswind, as well as upwind.

     As early as October 1940, carrier air groups were directed to undertake
the development of a standard doctrine for divided carrier air group attacks
on enemy formations.  Previous to this, the Fleet air arm had concentrated on
simultaneous high-level and dive-bombing and torpedo attacks, massing air
strength for a concentrated and coordinated attack on the target.

     Development of a doctrine for carrier launching and recovery operations
in submarine waters was pushed.  This development had started much earlier,
when the British carrier Courageous, while steaming on a steady course
recovering her aircraft, had been sunk by a submarine.

     One problem in 1940 that was carried to its initial fruition was the
establishment of doctrine and procedures for the joint operation of submarines
and patrol planes.  The procedures and doctrines developed as indicated in the
following reports paid dividends during the war, not only in combat
operations, but in air-sea-rescue operations:

     Type tactics with submarines and light surface vessels have been
conducted by Patrol Wings One and Two for furthering the policy of the
Commander-in-Chief to develop and perfect joint tactics amongst various types.

     Considerable advance has been accomplished in finding patrol planes from
submarines and such exercises have been frequently conducted by the units of
Patrol Wing Two.

     Patrol Wing One conducted night horizontal bombing practice using the
Utah as a target.  This was the first occasion that a ship target had been
used for such a practice.

Major Changes in Fleet Operating Schedules

     A measure of the effort being put into training the new personnel in the
simple skill of learning to function in all kinds of weather and conditions at
sea is indicated by the miles each ship steams during a twelve-month period.
By June 30, 1940, the battleships had steamed an average of about 24,000 miles
during the fiscal year, with the high ship, the Oklahoma, having covered
33,022 miles.  The average was about twice the previous peacetime total.

     I believed strongly in keeping the Fleet at sea and so kept two thirds of
it operating at sea as a routine measure.  Major changes in the operating
schedules - which showed up strongly in the number of ships in port on
December 7, 1941 - took place after my detachment.  These changes resulted in
normally keeping only a little more than one third of the Fleet operating at
sea.  The reasons this change was made by Admiral Kimmel are stated in the
following reports, made long after I had left the Fleet:

     From July 1, 1940 to January 28, 1941, all vessels operated under the
general policy of operating four weeks out of every six week period.  From
January 28, until March 25, 1941, this command was organized into two task
forces, one force operating while the other force was in upkeep.  Since March
26, 1941 all vessels have been organized into three task forces, each force
has operated one third of the time, thus allowing two thirds of the time for
upkeep, exclusive of Navy Yard overhauls.

     Under this [previous] system, ships averaged four operating weeks . . .
to two weeks in upkeep.  With increasing necessity for basic war training and
security measures in Fleet operating areas, transition to a Task Force
operational program was effected.  Two Task Forces were employed at first,
each at sea and in port alternate weeks.  This arrangement proved
impracticable because Of large fuel expenditures and loss of extended upkeep
periods essential to material maintenance.  With the Organization of the
Pacific Fleet, a three Task Force assignment was adopted to insure necessary
coordinated Task Force training for war, to provide for instant transition to
full war operational status, to conserve fuel, and permit most efficient use
of repair ship upkeep facilities.  Under this reassignment, Task Forces
averaged 8 days at sea to thirteen in port.

     By this action, Admiral Kimmel reduced the time the Fleet spent at sea
from 66 percent under Admiral Richardson to 38 percent.

Tactical Publications

     One of my last acts as CINCUS was to approve many changes to our Fleet
tactical publications, so that the new CINCUS would at least have a temporary
doctrinal platform from which to advance.  In doing this I said:

     The Commander-in-Chief is aware that current war developments have been
leading, and will continue to lead, to many revisions, both minor and major,
in conception as to the optimum methods of employing aircraft.  He also
realized that the present proposed changes are susceptible, as they stand, of
further improvement, both in arrangement and in detail.  It is essential,
however, to have a better basis than currently exists for development and
improvement of the publications under consideration, and he desires that the
revisions as now proposed be undertaken at once.

Command of the Fleet from a Carrier

     One of the experiments carried out in the fall of 1940 was the exercise
of tactical command of the Fleet from an aircraft carrier.  Some of the
younger members of my staff believed that the nerve center of the Fleet in the
next war would be in the carriers and stated that the tactical command of a
task fleet could more appropriately and effectively be exercised from a
carrier.

     When the opportunity arose, due to the absence of the regular flagship of
the Fleet for overhaul, I authorized the shift of the Fleet Flag to the USS
Enterprise.  The Enterprise had not been built for duty as a fleet flagship.
She lacked communication equipment, both radio and visual, for handling
expeditiously the heavy Fleet traffic.  This was particularly a handicap when
operating tactically.  The spaces for the various Fleet staff functions were
cramped.  The personal accommodation problem was unusually complicated when
Secretary Knox was aboard during part of this period.

     So, after some three-weeks trial and a period of tactical exercises at
sea, the flag was shifted back to a battleship, the USS New Mexico, on
September 21, 1940.

     When Commander Battle Force, I was Commander White Fleet during a
tactical exercise held in September 1939.  Perhaps it is worth recording that,
during one phase of this tactical exercise, I placed the only carrier in the
White Fleet (USS Enterprise) and her plane guards (USS Cummings and USS
Tucker) at the center of the White Fleet disposition.  The Enterprise was
protected by the antiaircraft fire of four battleships, disposed ahead on the
axis, of seven cruisers, spaced on circle two, and of eighteen destroyers,
spaced on circle three.  Circle spacing was one mile.

[See Aircraft Carrier: USS Saratoga (CV-3).]

     I believe that this was the first time that both of the following
occurred:

     (1)   the carrier occupied the key spot in a cruising formation

     (2) all the antiaircraft resources of the formation were disposed for the
protection of the carrier

     While the formations used by the task groups of the Fast Carrier Task
Force during World War II were based on countless variants of the formation
used by me on this occasion, still, the basic principles of the September 29,
1939 formation largely governed these variants.

     My predecessor, Admiral Bloch, thought highly of this positioning of the
carrier and, commenting on the usual practice of separating the carrier from
the main body of the Fleet, said:

     One of the disadvantages Of Operating carriers at a distance from the
Main Body is that not Only is the carrier deprived of effective antiaircraft
defense by guns, but the Main Body is deprived of effective antiaircraft
defense by carrier fighters.  It is important that we realize the ability of
fighters to interpose and to punish severely unprotected flights of bombing
planes and that we train them for that duty.

     I used a similar formation again in November 1939 when the Saratoga was
in the Fleet center.  This time I placed the battleships on circle three, the
cruisers on circles four and five, and the destroyers on circles five and six.

     The carrier commanders were slow to accept the advantages of a position
within the main body.  They were quick to point out the extra ease with which
enemy carrier aircraft could locate carriers when with the main body, and the
limitations on carrier movement when within any large formation.

     As late as the tactical exercises of September 1940, the Commander GREEN
Fleet, who had tactical command of battleships, cruisers, destroyers,
submarines, and patrol planes, assumed in his estimate of enemy intentions
that Commander BROWN Fleet would separate his carriers from the BROWN main
body, and from each other, but keep them close enough to be able to provide
carrier aircraft to protect the BROWN main body from the GREEN patrol plane
air attacks.

Amphibious Training

     Urged on by the Marine Corps, the Navy had made steady progress in
training for amphibious operations during the 1930's.

     As Commander Battle Force, I had participated in the planning for a Joint
amphibious exercise, which was held from 15 to 22 January 1940 in the
Monterey, California, area.  It was a miniature edition, in many respects, of
the amphibious operations of World War II.  As stated by the commanders
concerned, the main objectives of the Monterey exercise, besides training both
the Army and the Navy in planning and executing Joint operations, were to
train the Army in embarking and disembarking one of the new triangular
divisions, and to provide an opportunity for the General Headquarters Air
Force and naval patrol squadrons to work together and with ground forces.

     Commander Battle Force (C. P. Snyder) conducted the Navy's part of the
exercise.  Upon its completion, I reported to the Navy Department:


the Fleet profited in the recent exercise from its association with the Army
in planning and in demonstrating that the two services can cooperate.

     The exercise was excellent training for all the forces assigned.
Particularly, it might be mentioned that the Army's Third Division, the new
triangular division, later participated in the initial Allied landings in
North Africa and in the invasion of Sicily.

     Soon after completion of the Monterey Exercise, Fleet Landing Exercise VI
was conducted (February 26, 1940 - March 12, 1940) in the Caribbean area,
although the Neutrality Patrol reduced the number of ships which normally
would have participated.

     Another landing and base defense exercise was held in the San Clemente
area from May 25, 1940 to June 1, 1940.  As a result of the Monterey exercise,
the War Department requested that Army officers be assigned temporary duty
with the Fleet.  The Chief of Naval Operations, in advising the
Commander-in-Chief of this request, said that the Army had stated:

     The recent minor joint exercises on the West Coast during the period
January 15th - January 20th showed that the knowledge possessed by many Army
officers of the tactics and techniques of Fleet operations is not sufficient
to secure the most efficient results from Joint operations.

     I favored close cooperation with the Army, and eight Army officers were
so ordered during Fleet Problem XXI.

     One further matter in the field of amphibious operations is worth
mentioning.  In August 1940, in a letter to the Department, I stated, "it is
considered that the technique of aerial photographic reconnaissance, by means
of which complete and usable maps of landing areas may be furnished attacking
forces immediately prior to a landing, should be developed at an accelerated
rate."  I have been told that this was done.

Advanced Light Force Practices

     Two Advanced Light Force Practices and Advanced Submarine Force Practices
were conducted in the San Diego-San Pedro area, in the several months before
the Fleet sailed westward on Fleet Problem XXI.  These practices called for
the conduct of attacks and the actual firing of exercise torpedoes by light
cruisers, submarines, aircraft, and destroyers at fast-steaming, surface-ship
formations, during heavy and well coordinated strafing, dive-bombing, and
horizontal-bombing attack exercises.  All combatant ships and aircraft in the
San Pedro-San Diego area, which were operative, participated in the exercise.

     The destroyers and light cruisers fired 42 torpedoes from ranges of 7,000
to 13,900 yards and made 10 actual hits.  The aircraft fired 24 torpedoes from
ranges of 2,500 to 5,000 yards and made 11 actual hits.  The submarines fired
10 torpedoes at estimated ranges of 900 yards to 2,040 yards and made 3 actual
hits.

     Ships maneuvered to avoid torpedoes.  The usual peacetime restrictions on
maneuvers of surface craft, in waters where our own submarines were operating,
were suspended in the interests of greater realism.  But a considerable number
of artificialities had to be retained as safety measures, because of the
necessity of the screening destroyers to act as recovery ships for the
expensive torpedos which were fired.  These artificialities limited the use of
smoke, set up minimum distances between light forces, and required the
submarine attacks to be made by sound.  But the exercises were more realistic
than any held previously when I had been in the Fleet.

     There was only one confirmed report of the sighting of a periscope during
the early stages of the submarine attack and no reports of the sighting of
deeply submerged submarines by the very heavy antisubmarine air patrols.  This
was a precursor of much wartime experience.

     The report of these exercises - forty-two pages in length - is an
interesting document.  One lesson pointed out, unfortunately, was relearned at
the Battle of Midway.  The report noted that the torpedo planes had been
subjected to" . . . several attacks by large numbers of opposing fighters at
0930, 0932, 0935, 0936, and 0940, and it appears that they would have suffered
greater losses than indicated [by the umpires] prior to the delivery of their
[torpedo] attack . .

     The report further noted, "In either case the estimate of [torpedo plane]
losses exceeds the total of 24 VTs which actually operated as torpedo planes,"
and commented, " . . . it appears that a relatively small number of the 24
torpedo planes would have succeeded in launching their attacks under similar
circumstances in a real engagement."  This was what happened at Midway.

Mining

     It was extremely difficult to work up any enthusiasm for training in
mining operations in the Fleet, until the impact of the magnetic mine started
to be appreciated, and stories of the tremendous damage caused by mines became
widely known.  However, our Navy was still training only with the moored
mines.  Our state of skill with this weapon was only passably satisfactory, as
the following report, submitted in January 1941 by Commander Minecraft, Battle
Force shows.  He stated that mining practices had continued their "modest
improvement".

Fleet Problem XXI

     The Fleet Problem, during the twenty-three year period between World War
I and World War II, was the big event of the Navy's year.  Fleet Problems were
expensive in time, money, and effort, but they led to the great advances in
strategical and tactical thinking which marked our naval development during
this period.

     The first Fleet Problem was held in 1923 in the Canal Zone area.  Its
purpose was "estimate training, study of war plans, ascertain defensive
condition of Panama Canal."

     In order that the professional officer personnel would give time and
study to the war problems of both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, the
problems were held in both oceans, although the Pacific was the favorite. The
1934 and 1939 problems were held in the Atlantic and Caribbean, while the
1935, 1937, 1938, and 1940 problems were held in the Pacific.  The 1936
problem was held in the Panama and west coast of Central America area.

     The story of Fleet Problem XXI in 1940 might as well start with a January
1940 despatch which conditioned some of the things we did during the planning
and playing of the Fleet Problem:

   ALUSNA [Naval Attache] Tokyo
   OPNAV [Office of CNO]

     According to Information I Have, the Japanese Navy is Making Plans Which
are Unusually Elaborate to Cover Our Fleet Problem.  In the Operating Areas
They Will Have Tankers in Addition to Submarines and Destroyers.

     The presence of Japanese ships in the general area of our Fleet Problem
would mean that all the thousands of radio messages sent during the Fleet
Problem would be copied and that there would be a heavy strain on the security
of our naval communication system.  Errors were bound to be made as officers
and men pressed to save seconds in putting messages into cryptographic
systems, and hurriedly transmitted them.  One error could provide the key to
Japanese cryptographic experts, which might spell insecurity for our
communication system in a future war.

     Additionally, plain language radio messages were a necessity during a
great deal of the close-in action occurring in Fleet Problems, particularly
those connected with air operations.  A skilled Japanese naval officer could
learn a great deal of the doctrine and procedures being used in the United
States Navy by a study of these plain language messages or by listening in
when voice radio was being used.  So, effective measures against prying eyes
and ears were desirable.

     The Commander-in-Chief issued the basic order on the problem, on January
15, 1940.  The forces involved were to be assembled at normal bases by March
31, 1940, and the problem was to last from April 1, 1940 to May 17, 1940.

     During Fleet Problems, simulated damage to ships and aircraft was applied
by umpires in accordance with a complicated set of rules governing damage from
various types of weapons-guns, bombs, torpedoes, or mines. These rules were
issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.  There was an umpire on each ship and
an additional umpire in each unit of ships or aircraft.  The umpires had full
authority to see that ships or aircraft were placed out of action or operated
in accordance with the damage assessed.

     The Commander-in-Chief, as Chief Umpire, was greatly interested in seeing
that the problem was played realistically, so that false conclusions would not
be drawn.

     No Commanding Officer of a ship or aircraft liked to be "put out of
action," so the pressure on each ship and aircraft umpire was strong to view
softly the theoretical damage received by his own ship or aircraft. Under date
of March 4, 1940, I opined to my subordinate commanders:

     The prompt and intelligent assessment of damage, and the report thereof,
in Fleet Problems and Exercises, not only have an important bearing on the
conduct of the exercises, but also contribute materially to their realism.

     The Commander-in-Chief further directed that every officer in the Fleet
be informed:

     Umpire rules shall be applied promptly and rigidly.

     Every effort shall be made to simulate actual war conditions as closely
as possible.

     Fleet Problem XXI had two major phases.  Each was a possible ORANGE War
situation, distinct and complete in itself.  During each of these two major
phases, the Fleet was divided into two forces of comparable but not equal
strength.  Appropriate subordinate commanders were designated as their "Fleet
Commanders" and exercised complete operational control over the units assigned
to them.  The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet was Chief Umpire and an intensely
interested observer of the operations.

     In order that the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and his staff could also
derive some operational training, and the U.S. Fleet could be trained as a
tactical unit to operate as it might have to do in accordance with the ORANGE
War Plan, a four day period for special exercises was provided between the two
major phases of the Fleet Problem.  During this period of special exercises,
the Fleet, in the main, operated as a single tactical unit under the
Commander-in-Chief.  For some of the special exercises, enemy units were
represented by a single ship or aircraft of each type, simulating the known
strength and characteristics of the Japanese Navy in that particular type of
ship or aircraft.  These "enemy units" then made air, sub marine, destroyer,
of battleline attacks on the U.S. Fleet, or all the units in the Fleet of a
particular type were divided up and assigned to either attack or defense.
During Fleet Problem XXI, these special exercises included large-scale
submarine attacks by our own submarines on the Fleet in various defensive
formations, full-blown air attacks On the Fleet by all the normally offensive
units of our carrier aircraft, and simultaneous defense of the Fleet by all
the normally defensive units of our carrier aircraft, as well as night
destroyer attacks by one half of Fleet destroyer strength, with the other half
used defensively.  They also included training in fueling destroyers at sea,
in battleline tactics, and in taking and changing from antisubmarine cruising
formations to battle formations or to antiaircraft cruising formations.

     In our tactical training extending over the months prior to the Fleet
Problem, the staff devised exercises which simulated combat operations which
had actually occurred, or we believe might be planned for, in the war then
going on between our future allies and enemies.  For instance, on January 18,
1940, Fleet Exercise 108 was a replica of the situation when the German pocket
battleship Graf Spee, on December 13, 1939, engaged the three British
cruisers, Exeter, Achilles, and Ajax, in what was known as the Battle of the
River Plate.

     A preliminary doctrine had been drawn up for light cruiser tactics
against a single major-caliber ship.  In Fleet Exercise 108, this doctrine was
tested, modified, arid retested.  Similarly, in Fleet Problem XXI, within the
limitations of the general conditions layed down by Naval Operations, we tried
to devise situations which would test certain features of our ORANGE War
Plans.

     The first major phase of Fleet Problem XXI placed in opposition two
fleets of unequal but comparable strength, with one fleet concentrated and the
other divided into detachments by considerable ocean spacing.  This simulated
the then contrasting situation of the United States and Japanese navies.  The
Japanese Navy, with the greater carrier strength, was concentrated in the
southern islands (Marshalls and Carolines).  The major U.S. naval strength
(the U.S. Fleet) was divided between the East and West Coasts, and the West
Coast units were further subdivided between the detachments in Hawaiian waters
and those in Southern California waters.  And the U.S. Fleet was weaker than
the Japanese Fleet in seaborne air power.

     The second major phase of Fleet Problem XXI was also designed to fit into
our ORANGE War Plans.  It involved the movement overseas of an expeditionary
force (Fleet Marine Force) protected by a major task force of the Fleet, the
seizure of a defended island base by the units of the Fleet Marine Force, and
the subsequent defense of the base by the landing force and the naval task
force against enemy attacks.  All this was to be carried out against defending
units of an enemy fleet and defending troops.  It was an operation quite
similar to that carried out at Tarawa and other islands in the Pacific by the
U.S. Fleet and against the Philippines by the Japanese, except that the
defending fleets did not show up to do their defending.

     Both major phases of the Fleet Problem were designed to afford training
in making estimates of the situation, in formulating subsequent plans and
operation orders, in making air searches over a large ocean area, and in
scouting and screening, in tests of communications, and in the coordination of
all types of air and ship operations.

     One of the greatest benefits derived from these Fleet Problems (no longer
held simultaneously employing all Atlantic and Pacific Ocean resources, since
the end of World War II) was the yearly training of so many senior officers in
the making of thorough and formal written "Estimates of the Situation," and
the formulation of detailed operation plans, involving, by and large, the
whole naval resources of the United States.  All Flag officers in the Fleet
were required to make these "Estimates of the Situation" and send them and
their own supporting plans and orders up to their next senior in the chain of
command.  Other officers in command were encouraged to submit similar written
appreciations, plans, and orders.

     In this way, since Fleet Problems generally were along probable future
war situations, the system made all senior seagoing officers think, at least
once a year, about war situations of the whole Navy, and not just of war
situations of individual fleets or parts of individual fleets.  This, I
believe, was fruitful training.

Communication Mobilization

     Before I discuss the major phases of the Fleet Problem, I think it
desirable to record that:

     Communication mobilization was made effective 25 March 1940, in order to
simulate communication conditions which might obtain during a period of
strained relations preceding actual hostilities.  Mobilized communications
continued through the problem and at the request of the Commander in Chief
have been extended indefinitely.

     Credit should be given my Communications Officer, Commander M. E. Curts
(now Admiral, USN), for this very worthy recommendation to continue
communication mobilization after the end of the Fleet Problem.

     If the Fleet Problem had resulted in no other advance in naval war
readiness and in training, this major step alone would have justified all the
money and effort put into the Fleet Problem.  This was true because there were
revealed major deficiencies in the current communication mobilization plans,
which were correctable.  But, "the above failure of Communication Plans to
find war conditions was in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief the most
valuable communication lesson learned in Fleet Problem XXI.  Immediate steps
are being taken to correct this situation. . .

     I will now get back to the major phases.  And it should be remarked here
that since there were only three carriers available in the Pacific, an
imbalance of seaborne air strength between any two forces had to be accepted,
if all the three carriers were to participate in all possible training.
However this provided training under conditions of inferior carrier strength,
which would be the initial situation were we soon to engage in war with the
Japanese.

necessary.

     Until the final stages of the campaign, MAROON will husband his air
strength, risking engagement only when decisive advantage can be gained at
comparatively little cost.  He expects, initially, to be very conservative in
employing his carrier offensively.

     The most unusual feature occurring during this second phase of the Fleet
Problem was a major night engagement between the two fleets.  This was the
first unplanned night fleet engagement in my experience.  It further
strengthened my belief that this was an area where the U.S. Fleet needed much
training.

     My relief as CINCUS (Kimmel), in commenting on this phase of the Problem
at the critique, opined:

     It is generally accepted that night engagements should be sought only by
a weaker force, already committed by circumstances or orders to decisive
engagements with a superior enemy.  Yet here was a situation in which the
night action was almost unavoidable.  It is believed that the engagement which
actually developed indicated there has been insufficient preparation for night
work between capital ships.  A command, thoroughly experienced in such night
encounter, would welcome an opportunity to engage under similar conditions,
particularly if it was known that his enemy was insufficiently trained.  The
development of general principles, standard practices, and thorough
indoctrination for action in a night melee is indicated.

     In night action even more than day, victory or defeat, at least insofar
as the individual ship is concerned, will depend upon early, accurate, and
rapid fire on an enemy ship, and the ability to maintain it, even while being
heavily hit.

     If this principle, which was stated so well by the future Fleet
Commander, and accepted as valid by so many other officers, had been
recognized as the key principle which would open or close the door to success
during the first major United States naval offensive in World War II (Solomons
Campaign), I am sure it would have received greater corrective
effort from myself and from my successor.

     One more point should be made before I button up this chapter on the
Fleet Problem.

     In a report on radio intelligence during the Problem, I stated, "The
Commander-in-Chief feels that the potentialities of radio intelligence are, in
general, insufficiently appreciated in the Fleet."  This was true, partly as a
result of the rigid secrecy exercised by the Department regarding
cryptanalysis efforts, even extending to the Fleet Commander himself.  In my
letter to the Department, I pointed out the need for the Fleet to be
knowledgeable in regard to all aspects of radio intelligence and approved a
recommendation of Commander Scouting Force that in the future:


     The activities of the radio intelligence organization should extend,
under the direction of the Exercise Fleet Commander to every aspect of the
work, including direction finding, interference, deception, radio intelligence
and cryptanalysis, applying to these tasks the maximum concentration of effort
and talent permitted by existing circumstances.


     Had the Department found this recommendation acceptable, and had it been
applied to the Department's own work, Pearl Harbor would not have found the
Pacific Fleet Commander uninformed in regard to cryptanalysis results on
Japanese codes and ciphers.